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BULGARIA: ECONOMIC SITUATION AND DEVELOPMENTS
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Introduction
This paper is intended to be presented to the members of the Senate of the Republic of
France. It is a shorter version of 1998 IME report on Bulgaria’s Current Economic
Situation and Long-Term Growth Prospects. The report per se is an attempt to reflect
country’s economic development in a broader institutional perspective, not merely
extrapolating current trends but rather taking into account policies, an international
context and the administrative capacity to follow certain policy paths. The goal of the
paper is to provide an orientation, rather than a full account of possible developments.
Background
Bulgarian economic reforms began in February 1991, but have had an uneven history.
The philosophy of the reform agenda was similar to that of Poland, but succeeding
Bulgarian governments failed to stick to it and implement it. In 1993-1996,
privatization had virtually stopped, elements of central planning (price controls,
transfers to loss-making state-owned enterprises, central government control over
these enterprises, political control over central bank’s board and policies, etc.) were
restored, and in early 1997, the country entered a hyperinflation curve.1 The only
feasible way to restrict the printing of money was to undertake a political change,
eliminating the political element in the central bank’s activities by fixing the exchange
rate and the introduction of a currency board arrangement (CBA).
In February 1997, under the leadership of then newly-elected President Petar
Stoyanov, political factions in the legislature agreed on fresh elections. Then Mr.
Stoyanov appointed a caretaker cabinet which promised a CBA solution and resumed
talks with the IMF and the international community in March and April, and stopped
printing money, thus curbing inflation. Elections took place in April, and a reform-
minded, rather centrist party, the United Democratic Forces (UDF), won an absolute
majority in the National Assembly; the leader of the party, Mr. Ivan Kostov, an
economist, former minister of finance in the coalition cabinet of 1991, became prime
minister. For the first time since the beginning of the reform period, the country had a
                                           
1 The 1991 reform consensus was based on the recognition of negative effects, after the then-Socialist
cabinet declared a moratorium on the country’s foreign debt payments, in March 1990. Market
reforms proceeded successfully until the elections of October 1991. The democratic minority cabinet
of 1991-1992 attempted to follow their philosophy, but without daring to go without price controls and
privatize promptly. Delays caused corruption in public-sector management. The emerging private
sector grew on the decapitalization of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and monopolies. With
eroded parliamentary support, the democratic cabinet resigned in late 1992, and a cabinet of experts
came into power. In mid-1994, it signed a Brady plan for Bulgaria, restructuring its foreign debt by
47%. Debt payment schedules required growth rates of 4-5% of GDP in 1995 and 1996. Technocrats,
backed by ad hoc majorities in the legislature, failed to promote the private sector and an investment-
friendly environment. Their successors, the Socialists, not only gave up 1991’s reform ideas but
introduced opposing economic policies. Zhan Videnov’s administration, backed by an absolute
majority in the Parliament, supported the loss-making public sector, at the price of draining the
banking sector and causing severe macroeconomic disequilibrium, bringing the country back to the
brink of defaulting in mid-1996, this time with a Brady deal in place.
2united Presidency, National Assembly and Council of Ministers, all equally committed
to promoting reform.
Macroeconomic Heritage
The year 1996 was an extreme case of financial shocks. At the end of December, when
the Socialist cabinet of Mr. Videnov resigned, the National Statistics Institute (NSI)
said that accumulated inflation was 310%. (In the first quarter of 1997, inflation shot
up to 438%). The CPI-deflated interest rate on bank deposits (even after the drastic
increase in the basic interest rate (BIR) of the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) in late
September, to 300% a year) was negative —  minus 43%. (In February 1997, the BIR
reached 18% a month, while inflation reached an unprecedented 242%.)
The differential in yields on local currency and hard currency deposits looked as
follows: on January 2, 1996, the BNB rate was 70.719 Bulgarian levs (BGL) to one
U.S. dollar, and on December 12 (the 1996 BGL depreciation peak), it was 511.69
BGL/USD; that is, a depreciation of 624% The accumulated interest rate on one-
month time deposits barely reached 104%. However, merchants and manufacturers
couldn’t keep prices below costs. By mid-January 1997, the rate was already 1,000
BGL/USD, and by the first week of February it had reached BGL 3,000.2 In March
1997, after the tight and coordinated monetary policies of the caretaker cabinet and
BNB, the local currency appreciated by 50%, back to 1,500 BGL/USD, and stabilized
at that level.
In mid-1997, the CBA was introduced. The monetary base would not exceed the gross
foreign reserves of the central bank, which was banned from financing the government
and refinancing commercial banks, and the currency was pegged to the German mark,
at a rate of 1000 BGL/DM.
One year after the introduction of the CBA, financial stabilization is obvious. Inflation
for the first half of 1998 is 2.3% and will probably be 6% by the year end. Foreign
reserves have increased significantly, which is a prerequisite for a stable money market.
The fiscal deficit was reduced from 13.4% of GDP in 1996 to 3.1% in 1997, and
became a surplus for the first six months of 1998. Unemployment has not increased
significantly, because of slow process of state property transfers and the delayed
liquidation of loss-making enterprises.
A three-year agreement with the IMF has been signed. It will bring in US $840 million
to support the balance of payments. The same amount will come from other
international institutions. The government enjoys the confidence of international
support in its mid-term. It has even adopted a thorough three-year economic
development program. Most of the targets in the program may be viewed as
achievable, but the basic macroeconomic aim —  a sustainable private sector and
competition-led economic growth —  is rather optimistic. The IMF and the cabinet in
Sofia believe that the 1998 GDP growth rate will turn out to be 4-5%. But there are
two factors that may lead to a surprise: 1) the pace of structural reform is slowing
down, and if there is no prompt change the economy could face another disaster; and
2) the world economy is approaching a deep recession, the impact of which on
                                           
2 Some markets dollarized completely; in real estate, virtually all (96%) transactions were executed in
US dollars, and in the car market 80% of deals were transacted in DM. In some special weeks most
consumer goods were salable in hard currency. Despite regulations, the USD became a dominant
accounting unit.
3Bulgaria has not been taken into account. We maintain that growth will hardly reach
3%, and that there must be a miscalculation. It is the same with inflation: the
government has stated that the inflation rate for 1998 will be 9%, but there is no real
reason for it to be more than 6%.
Agreement with the IMF
Negotiations with the IMF on the three-year program (Extended Fund Facility, or
EFF) were finalized on July 31. There is no precedent of such a program for a
European emerging economy. The closest example is that of Argentina’s EFF of
December 1997. The difference between the two is that while Argentina’s three-year
program deals with the consolidation of that country’s economic recovery, Bulgaria
still has to attain the prerequisites for sustainable growth. For this reason, Bulgaria’s
Policy Memorandum is much more detailed.
The IMF, as well as the criticism of free-standing observers, have forced the cabinet to
acknowledge that the ultimate objective of the reform process is to create a
“competitive, predominantly private economy.” The declared priorities of the EFF are:
? to?complete the privatization of banks and enterprises,
? to?develop and deepen financial markets,
? to?restructure social safety nets,
? to?simplify and strengthen taxation and the tax authorities,
? to?reform the agriculture and energy sectors,
? to?further liberalize exchange rate and trade regimes, and
? to?foster much-needed institutional reforms in order to underpin a competitive
market economy.
A precondition for all of these is to maintain the CBA and increase the transparency of
government expenditures. In order to achieve the latter, the cabinet agreed to reduce
and eliminate quasi-fiscal subsidies, which were usually channeled through off-budget
accounts. In 1997, funds distributed in this manner equaled 1/8 of GDP, and in 1998
the government has stuck with this tradition in order to retain its control over
economic affairs.
It has been agreed that keeping the CBA as a stabilizing institutional factor would
require that in the coming three years:
? that the?Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) ensure that the reserves of the issue
department are at least equal to its liabilities;3
? that the BNB does not extend credits to the government;
? that?commercial banks’ required reserves are kept above 11% of liabilities;
? that?the government does not amend the existing exchange rate regulations and
refrain from agreements that do not comply with Article 8 of the IMF Charter.
Besides canceling major off-budget accounts (Energy Resources Fund and the State
Reconstruction and Development Fund), there number of prior actions that the cabinet
has committed itself to undertake in order to have the EFF Agreement enforced. Here
is a list of most important of these actions:
1. eliminate price and profit margin controls;
2. adopt an action plan for phasing out energy subsidies over the coming three years;
3. raise prices on district heating for households;
                                           
3 The reserves consist of notes and coins in circulation, the BNB deposits of the government, banks
and BNB banking department, and the non-financial sector, excluding liabilities to the IMF.
44. adopt a program to deregulate and restructure the electricity sector, separating
generation, transmission and distribution;
5. sign contracts with consultants for the privatization of the 30 biggest state-owned
enterprises and state-owned banks4;
6. remove restrictions on debt-equity swaps;
7. refrain from setting a binding price for privatization auctions;
8. achieve an 8% capital adequacy ratio for all banks and revoke the licenses of banks
that fail to meet the minimum capital requirement of BGL 10 billion; and
9. adopt a timetable for the introduction of uniform ID numbers for all tax-payers and
establish a separate system for the monitoring of large-scale taxpayers.
It is important to mention that most of these preliminary requirements, as well as many
of the policies in the EFF, have been in place for number of years. They were
suggested by independent economists (domestic and foreign) and think tanks not
because they are extraordinarily clever, but rather the opposite —  because they are
obvious.
Savings and Investment
Macroeconomic instability has been a factor in the constant diminishing of every
incentive for saving and investing. Because of the country's inability to attract foreign
investment, it needed a mobilization of domestic savings. However, for the period
between 1991 and 1994, investment as a percentage of GDP decreased, from 22.6% to
8.2%. A sharp drop in investment activity is visible after 1992.5 The underlying
reasons are in the volatile macroeconomic environment, weakened demand, and the
absence of privatization. In 1997, the population had 1.452 billion levs in savings, no
more than 8.5% of GDP. Investment remained basically unchanged, at 12.9% of GDP.
According to the BNB, the population’s deposits grew by 25.5 billion levs in 1993, and
by about 18 billion levs in 1994. But throughout the entire 1991-1996 period, the
interest rates on deposits were lower than the CPI. This has gradually undermined the
purchasing power of savings, and depositors have suffered losses. In the period
between 1991 and 1997, two years marked record negative real interest rates: -24% in
1994 and -43% in 1996.
In 1998, the BGL deposits of the population have been relatively stable. Moreover,
they have shown a slight trend of increasing, due to low and even negative inflation,
making the real interest rate a bit higher. The population’s hard-currency deposits did
not change significantly, either. This can be explained mainly by the stable domestic
currency and the fact that the interest rate differential between BGL and DM (USD)
has stayed unchanged. In general, the weak inclination to save is a consequence of low
interest rates and a restrictive income policy.
Private Sector Capitalization
Private businesses used to start up alongside a comparatively developed public sector
frozen by delayed privatization and quasi-fiscal subsidies. During the first years of the
                                           
4 For bank privatization, the preliminary requirement is to have contracts with intermediaries for the
privatization of Bulbank and Expressbank.
5 According to the BNB, at the end of 1996 gross domestic savings as a percentage of GDP were at
13.5%, while gross investment was 12.5% of GDP.
5reforms, state manufacturers worked at fixed and low profit rates. This made high
retail profit margins possible, actually creating private business. Private business
started to act as retailers or suppliers. Similarly, private financial institutions were
established with credits from public banks. It became easier to siphon off assets from
public enterprises and financial institutions than to invest in a green field, and this
phenomenon has affected all aspects of business practices, including the structure of
expenses. It was destructive to both the old state sector and the emerging private
business sector.
The increased number of private companies did not result in an adequate political
establishment to promote the interests of the private sector. The majority of private
firms are sole proprietors. There is, however, no reliable data on how many sole
proprietorships have been established in order to reduce social welfare and other
taxes.6
At the end of 1989, Bulgaria had about 24,500 private firms registered. By mid-1994
private companies already numbered 330,000, though by the end of 1996 their number
had decreased to 307,000.7 Statistical data on the sector, however, are quite
unreliable. In 1997, for example, the total number of registered economic agents was
425,424. Of those, 270,208 did not submit their annual balance sheets, which can be
interpreted as meaning either that they do not operate but have not yet undergone the
necessary court procedure to close the business, or that they operate in the "shadow"
sector of the economy.
Private firms capitalize on family resources. An IME survey in 1996 indicated that 75-
80% of them were set up in this manner. But they grow on links with the public sector.
Private entrepreneurs reduce SOEs’ operating costs as sub-contractors. Given their
size, however, SOEs are difficult to restructure. Lack of (political) will to do so sets
incentives to decapitalize them. The benefit of SOEs was that they eliminate idle use of
inventory and personnel; private firms benefited as suppliers but did not report or
invest the profits.
The private sector contributed 58.79% of the gross value added in 1997. However, the
prevailing number of private companies were registered in sectors with a low level of
capital consumption. Thus, the number of newly-registered private companies in
industry and construction is still lower than the corresponding figures for other CEE
countries. Likewise, there are huge discrepancies between the firms registered in
different regions of the country.
For the nearest future the prospect looks bright, with the introduction of more friendly
tax legislation and the liberalization of foreign trade. The cabinet has already signed
consultant contracts for most of the Bulgarian “blue-chip” privatization deals (i.e.
telecommunications, the petrochemical plant in Bourgas, etc.); bank privatization has
started with the United Bulgarian Bank and Bulgarian Post Bank sales. The negative
sides of the process are, however, still in place, and consist of the following:
                                           
6 Opportunities to reduce some taxes explain why every eighth Bulgarian citizen of an active adult
age is a sole proprietor.
7 The World Bank book, Financing Government in Transition: Bulgaria (The political Economy of
Tax Policies, Tax Bases, and Tax Evasion), edited by Zeljco Bogetic and Arye Hillman, The World
Bank, Washington D.C., 1995, lists the following reasons for the rapid growth of private firms during
that period: individuals “prepared themselves for the capitalist market economy by becoming
“capitalists”; unemployment made the opportunity costs of “going into business” low, tax and other
incentives to register, and “the choice to be small”; i.e., to be invisible to the tax authorities” (p.50).
6? the process is still not transparent;
? the pace is still slow;
? the emphasis is still put on “negotiations with potential buyers,” rather than
auctions;
? the sellers (different government agencies) restrict the execution of buyer’s rights
through the inclusion in privatization contracts of provisions requiring the new
owner to maintain a certain employment level and the completion of an “investment
plan” (for more details, see below, next section);
? the public capital market is still underdeveloped; and
? commercial banks still prefer to invest outside the country, due to high risk and
unsettled creditors’ rights protection.
A Note on banks
Real banking sector reform in Bulgaria started in 1989, when communist-era central
banking was swapped for a modern two-tiered banking system with a typical central
bank and 59 commercial banks, most of them established from previous branches of
the BNB. The legal framework for the functioning of the banking system was created
with the passage of the Law on the Bulgarian National Bank (1991) and the Law on
Banks and Credit Activity (1992), later replaced by the acts that introduced the CBA.
As a result of the low entry barriers into the banking sector, the number of private
banks increased significantly —  from two in 1990 to 26 in 1995. Their assets as a
proportion of the total assets of the banking system were 3.1% in 1992, 6.4 % in 1993,
15.6 % in 1994 and 22.4 % in 1995. In 1996, private banks’ assets share of total
banking sector assets fell to 15.2%, due to loss of public confidence in private banks.
In 1993-94, there were more loss-making state banks than private ones, and their total
losses were larger as well. Nine commercial banks (four large state banks, three small
ones and two small private banks) accounted for 79.1% of total losses in the banking
system in 1993 and for 87.2% of total losses in 1994. In 1995 the large private banks
followed suit, and the number of loss-making private banks increased.
Bank Assets Structure in late 1996 and 1997
State-owned Private Foreign Total k
Oct. 1996 84.8% 12.6% 2.6% 100.0% 0.74
Nov. 1996 85.2% 12.2% 2.6% 100.0% 0.74
Dec. 1996 86.3% 11.1% 2.6% 100.0% 0.76
Jan. 1997 88.3% 8.8% 2.9% 100.0% 0.79
Feb. 1997 89.0% 7.8% 3.2% 100.0% 0.80
Mar. 1997 88.4% 7.8% 3.8% 100.0% 0.79
Dec. 1997 67.1% 14.8% 18% 100.0% n.a.
Commercial Banks in Bulgaria, 1990-1997
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Year-end Total 70 78 59 41 45 47 35 34
incl. Foreign 0 0 0 1 3 5 7 9
Licensed during the
year
61 8 2 7 10 4 2 2*
incl. Foreign 0 0 0 1 2 1 2 2




0 0 1 4 3 1 0 0
Revoked licenses
during the year
0 0 1 0 0 0 14 4
Source: BNB
Balance profit and losses of commercial banks (BGL, millions)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Profit 7201 2903 1896 8702 4646 181 406
Losses 1845 2291 4172 10056 29181 63 37
Net Profit 5356 612 -2276 -1354 -24535 118 369
Number of banks with
losses
2 6 11 15 23 n.a.* n.a.**
including private banks
and foreign banks
0 0 5 7 15 n.a. n.a.
Commercial banks’ losses were largely due to bad loans. There were two major
sources of bad loans in the Bulgarian banking sector: non-performing loans extended
to SOEs in the pre-transition period, and the credit expansion of most banks, especially
private ones, after 1990.
One of the factors that led to new “bad borrowing” was the government policy of
replacing direct budget subsidies to the real sector with quasi-fiscal subsidies, through
new credit injections. There was no political will to close the loss-makers until mid-
1996, and they had to be kept alive through credit amnesties, which deepened the crisis
in the banking sector even more. The only state-owned bank to avoid new doubtful
lending was Bulbank, which finally aggregated 91% of all standard loans at the end of
1996.
A weak private sector, bad banking management, the over-supply on the banking
market, the concentration of credit risk, the negative structure of credit portfolios and
the increasing share of non-performing credits, the decapitalization of the banking
system and the ensuing loss of confidence in the banking system, etc., led to turmoil in
the banking system.
A precondition for the banking crisis was set at the beginning of reforms in 1990, when
the process of establishing a deeply fragmented banking system began, with a large
number of small state-owned banks specialized in providing funds to particular
branches and regions. Almost all of them inherited a significant number of non-
performing credits, extended to enterprises during the socialist era. To a great extent
their further decapitalization was due to the slow process of bank consolidation.
One of the most serious problems leading to the banking crisis of 1996-1997 was that
of both the non-performing loans extended to SOEs in the pre-transition period and the
non-performing credits granted after 1990 by most banks, especially the private ones.
Some 50% of all loans granted by state-owned banks to non-financial institutions were
not collectible. To a great extent this is due of the state’s emphasis on lending to so-
called “strategic SOEs.” For many SOEs, the only way to service debts was new
8borrowing. The preservation of loss-making enterprises in the public sector used to be
a key government policy.
By the end of 1995, 41% of all loans granted by both state and private banks to non-
financial institutions were irrecoverable. Only 39% of total lending by private banks
was regularly serviced.
The problem with most of the private banks stemmed from the common practice of
extending credits to persons and firms related to the banks’ top-level management.
Some of the banks were created for the sole purpose of directing money (collected by
both deposits from the population and through refinancing by the Central Bank)
toward newly-emerged private firms, with no intention of collecting the loans back.
The deterioration of banks’ credit portfolios was also due to the lack of effective
creditors’ rights enforcement. No legal procedures for the bankruptcy of insolvent
SOEs were in place.
The result: from May 1996 until April 1997, 18 banks were closed and put under
special supervision by the BNB; thus, 24% of total assets in the banking system were
put under conservatorship. This is estimated to be the biggest recent banking crisis
worldwide. Of 27 private banks existing at the time, the four largest ones were put
under special supervision.
The financial condition of commercial banks has improved to a greet extent since the
beginning of 1997. As a result of the depreciation of the BGL and the brief period of
hyperinflation, the capitalization of the banking system has improved. The depreciation
of the local currency helped banks to restructure their portfolios.
Following the new Banking Act, which replaced the previous Banking and Credit Act,
and the Basle Accords and BNB regulations, the capital adequacy of all banks has
improved significantly, reaching a level of 8%. The 1998 target level of 10% seems like
it will not be a problem at all.
Currently, all Bulgarian banks can be divided into three groups.
The first group consists of public or recently-privatized banks (UBB, Expressbank,
Bulbank, Bulgarian Post Bank, SSB, Biochim, Hebrosbank), representing 76% of
banking system assets. At the end of June 1998, their total capital adequacy was
35.3%. This indicates the stability that was; the previous year total capital adequacy
was 11.9%.
The second group of banks includes small private and one community banks
(Municipal bank, Unionbank, First Investment Bank, Corporate Bank, Bulgarian
Commercial and Industrial Bank, International Orthodox Bank, Creditexpress, First
East International Bank, Trakiyabank, Bulgaria-Invest Commercial Bank, Teximbank,
Credit Bank, Balkan Universal Bank, Central Cooperative Bank, Bulgarian-Russian
Investment Bank, International Bank for Commerce and Development). These banks
hold 18.1% of total banking system assets. Their total capital adequacy was 32.2% at
the end of June 1998.
The third group includes four foreign banks and five branches (ING Bank, Bayerische-
Bulgarische Handelsbank, BNP-Dresdner Bank, Raiffeisenbank, Xiosbank, National
Bank of Greece, Eurobank, Bulgarian Investment Bank and Ionian Bank), representing
6.8% of the banking assets in Bulgaria. One more foreign bank, Ziraat Bankasi, opened
its sixth international branch in Sofia on June 11, 1998. The total capital adequacy of
this group at the end of June was 34.1%.
9A long-term problem for Bulgarian banks seems to be a making an adequate profit
from bank activities. Banks still consider lending a very risky activity because the
business environment has not improved significantly, as well as the fact that the
execution of creditors’ rights is low and banks have faced problems collecting on non-
performing loans. In general, they are reluctant to finance the real sector for two
reasons. On the one hand, the banking sector has not regained its confidence that
companies can pay their credits back, while on the other, companies are not willing to
put up with the extremely high guarantees required by the banks. The tough lending
requirements of the commercial banks prevent private-sector investment in capital-
consuming sectors, such as industry. This additionally reduces the quality and variety
of banking services are rather limited, and include taking deposits, giving very short-
term credits and intermediation in payments in Bulgaria and abroad. It is expected that
the future development of the capital market will have a serious effect on commercial
banks. The development of the capital market may create additional opportunities for
banks to diversify their services, by getting involved with intermediation in trade with
securities.
Interest rates have fallen significantly since March 1997. They are likely to remain low,
since no one demands credit but the government, which is enjoying budget balance or
even surplus.
As agreed with the IMF, bank privatization should be completed by the year 2000. The
only banks to remain in the public sector would be the largest retail bank, the State
Savings Bank (SSB), and Biochim. The SSB is restricted to lending money to
corporations, is the only bank which has a 100% government guarantee on its deposits,
and holds about 95% of outstanding mortgage loans. By mid-2000, the SSB should
enter a privatization procedure. The reality is rather less encouraging. The process is
painfully slow, and the Bank Consolidation Company (the seller) is finding it hard to
attract strategic foreign investors who can bring a breath of fresh air (money) into the
banking system. The task seems extremely difficult, especially in light of international
capital market turbulence.
Trends in trade: in search of competitive advantages
If we look at Bulgarian exports prior to the beginning of economic reform in the
1990s, we will realize that the highest share was among ex-COMECON countries
(today emerging market leaders) to the CMEA market itself. As a share of total
exports, Bulgaria —  along with then-Czechoslovakia —  was the last to decrease
CMEA-export efforts as of 1989; the other countries had started reducing this trade in
1986. Another difference is that Bulgaria exported mostly to the ex-Soviet Union,
while the other countries traded among themselves. According to the calculations of
Rumen Dobrinski, the share of CMEA trade in the second half of the 1970s and 1980s
averaged about 60% of Bulgaria’s total trade. Closest to Bulgaria was Czechoslovakia,
with 51-52%, Romania’s CMEA share of trade was less than 30%, and Hungary and
Poland were always between 40% and 50%.8 Dobrinski shows that the accumulation
of Bulgaria’s foreign debt coincided with a lack of alternative export routes in 1986,
and was related to an attempt to increase exports to COMECON countries, an attempt
                                           
8Rumen Dobrinski, Transition Failures: Anatomy of the Bulgarian Crisis, Vienna, WIIW, 1997, p.7.
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which obviously failed from the very first steps if we convert the turnover into US
dollars.9
Besides some sporadic attempts to impose protection tariffs, in the “normal” years of
1991-1994 the Bulgarian economy demonstrated extraordinary openness, as shown in
the table.
International trade flows of Bulgaria as percent of GDP
Year Export Import Total turnover
1989 34.5 32.3 66.9
1990 23.3 22.7 46.0
1991 42.3 33.3 75.5
1992 45.6 51.9 97.5
1993 34.4 46.8 81.2
1994 41.5 43.1 84.6
1995 40.9 43.2 84.1
1996 49.2 51.0 100.2
1997 50.1 46.2 96.3
Following a decrease in 1990, the percentage share of foreign trade in the GDP
became relatively stable. The data in column 2 indicate that Bulgaria was a highly open
economy (for the sake of comparison, in 1994 Switzerland’s exports/GDP ratio was
35%).10
The same is true for groups of trade partners, but to a lesser extent. The following
tables demonstrate the group dynamics in total exports and imports, respectively.
Relative share of exports to some groups of countries
1996 1997 1998 (6 month)
USD m. share USD m. share USD m. share
EU 1,912.5 39.1% 2,128.7 43.3% 1,083.8 49.5%
Other OECD 554.0 11.3% 661.7 13.5% 249.0 4.7%
EFTA 49.5 1.0% 44.3 0.9% 15.5 0.7%
CEFTA 94.8 1.9% 137.1 2.8% 119.9 5.5%
Balkan countries 514.2 10.5% 291.9 5.9% 397.6. 7.5.%
                                           
9Rumen Dobrinski, ibid., pp. 8-12.
10 Source: NSI.
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Relative share of imports from some groups of countries
1996 1997 1998 (6 month)
USD m. share USD m. share USD m. share
EU 1,780.3 35.1% 1,823.1 37.3% 1,044.9 44.5%
Other OECD 275.4 5.4% 343.8 7.0% 227.1 9.7%
EFTA 86.4 1.7% 86.8 1.8% 34.0 1.5%
CEFTA 159.9 3.2% 231.7 4.7% 120.0 5.1%
Balkan countries 163.3 3.2% 95.2 1.9% 68.4. 2.1%
Data for the most recent years have shown a tendency of increased trade with the EU,
CEFTA and Balkan countries.
Main partners in Bulgarian foreign trade, 1997
Country US $ mln. Share of
exports
Country US $ mln. Share of
imports
Total 3,650 72.9 Total 3,777 75.8
Italy 575.1 11.7 Russia 1,374.8 28.1
Russia 391.8 8.0 Germany 563.2 11.5
Germany 468.1 9.5 Italy 347.1 7.1
Turkey 442.3 9.0 Greece 156.5 3.2
Greece 405.9 8.3 France 156.5 3.2
Yugoslavia 124.6 2.5 Austria 118.0 2.4
Ukraine 146.5 3.0 Ukraine 176.6 3.6
Macedonia 98.2 2.0 USA 181.2 3.7
UK 130.6 2.7 UK 126.9 2.6
France 132.3 2.7 Turkey 101.6 2.1
US 128.8 2.6 Netherlands 91.0 1.9
Spain 76.2 1.6 Switzerland 77.5 1.6
Moldova 99.9 2.0 Czech Rep. 63.0 1.3
Netherland
s
75.4 1.5 Belgium 60.5 1.2
Georgia 122.7 2.5 Brazil 65.5 1.3




We may draw the following conclusions. There is no distinct leader for the country’s
exports. The export share is highest for Italy, Germany, Greece and Turkey. The
CEFTA share of exports for 1997 and for the second quarter of this year has grown.
The CEFTA import share has increased also. Further increases in trade with CEFTA
countries as a result of the CEFTA agreement might be expected. The level of imports
from Russia is higher than that from other foreign partners. However, foreign trade
with Russia declined in comparison to 1996. Imports from Russia decreased
significantly. This is due to the decrease in the import of energy resources and raw
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materials (see below, Table 11 on the commodity structure of Bulgaria’s exports), and
proves that the economy is searching for alternatives for mineral resources imports.
Bulgaria’s situation reflects the situation in other Balkan countries. Meanwhile, some
considerable markets are virtually missing: exports to France are roughly five times
lower than those to Germany, the UK or Italy.
The share of exports to neighboring countries Greece and Turkey is 18% of total
foreign turnover, while the import share is 6%. Bulgaria’s exports to Turkey increased
last year. The country’s longest border is with Romania, but exchange with this largest
emerging market in the region is far from being active.
Broadly diversified trade with neighboring countries equals the share with remote ones.
This incurs, presumably, additional opportunity costs.
Even the leading export products involve high import components. In 1997 significant
increases in exports were seen in the following sectors: ferrous and non-ferrous metals
(20.7%), textiles and clothing (10.2%), and mineral products (9%), Marked declines in
exports were registered in the following sectors: food and agricultural products
(-23.6%), and chemical products (-6.6%). High energy consumption is the main reason
behind Bulgarian chemical products’ loss of competitive advantage. The foodstuffs
export decrease is due to the tobacco component. There are reserve opportunities in
livestock and cattle-breeding, but investment in this area requires restructuring in the
enforcement of land property rights and a relatively long rate of return. The balance is
categorically positive in energy consumption and sub-product sectors. The trend
toward exports of raw materials and non-processed commodities persisted in 1997.
The further liberalization of foreign trade and the elimination of entry barriers will
facilitate trade with Balkan countries.
Bulgarian foreign trade is sensitive to changes in relative prices and international
demand. The international market environment is not favorable for Bulgarian foreign
trade, particularly in terms of the drop in carbamide prices. A feature of Bulgarian
exports are their low profitability, because of the high share of imported inputs that go
into export commodities. The Bulgarian government will negotiate with the IMF to
introduce capital account convertibility by the end of the year. (Article 8 of the IMF
Statutes).
Since the introduction of the currency board, Bulgarian foreign trade’s commodity and
geographical structure have not changed significantly.
Foreign trade under a currency board regime represents a major challenge. If we look
at countries in similar conditions,11 it is obvious that it takes two to three years for an
economy to adjust and identify its competitiveness.
1998 Tequila Effects
There are two notions of the so-called “Tequila” effect: a) [portfolio] investors pull
out, expecting unfavorable developments; and b) impacts of such capital flows from
other economies. The importance for Bulgaria of different notions of Tequila effect
stems from the open character of the economy and the role of foreign debt as a
constraint to domestic decision making.
                                           
11 See: Nissan Leviathan (ed.), Proceedings of a Conference on Currency Substitution and Currency
Boards, World Bank Discussion Paper No. 207, World Bank, 1993; Argentina, The Convertibility
Plan: Assessment and Potential Prospects, World Bank Report N15402-AR, July 12, 1996, pp. 9-11,
18-21.
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The stabilizing effect of the currency board regime was partially felt even before it was
actually introduced in July 1997. The lev stabilized at the level of BGL 1,500 per US
$1 in March and later depreciated with the Deutschemark, by about 11-12%. Attracted
by the prospects of high yields (due to the interest rate of 18.2% a month, political
turbulence in late December 1996 and January 1997, and prompt, peaceful and
negotiated outcome of the political crisis which opened opportunities for agreement
with IFIs to support the country’s balance of payments), foreign portfolio investors
took the risk and brought about US $300 million into the country, according to IME
estimates. This happened in January and early February, but already by April 28 the
interest rate (determined by that of three-month T-bill yields) had fallen to a monthly
level of 6.2%, and to 3.59% a month by May 26. With no opportunity to invest in
equities (due to the absence of an institutionalized capital market), they withdrew their
investments and left with respective gains of about US $80-120 million in May and
June, before the introduction of the currency board.
Thus, “Investors Pull Out Because of Russia,” or some sort of Tequila effect, has in
fact happened, on a small scale, without causing any instability. There is no reason why
the same might not happen again with more severe impact in the future, and that is
why it is important to know why it happened so easily this time:
1. the first factor was the very size of the investment;
2. the second was the amount of savings outside banks, approximately US $1 billion.
Citizens and corporations bought dollars for everyday use during the winter and kept
them, changing several million dollars a day and thus not allowing the exchange rate to
skyrocket when investors converted their local currency gains into hard currency ones.
This was the confidence in banks that worked, but it shows that the level of savings
(the credibility) would have a decisive role in the future. Another factor has to do with
the general environment, which, in fact, has limited the amount of investment.
But the impact of 1998’s turbulence of global capital flows also has indirect effects,
which consist of the following:
? it raises obstacles to Bulgarian companies’ (and government’s) access to foreign
capital;
? it increases difficulties in the sale of Bulgarian banks;
? it blocks Bulgarian exports12 to Russia, which low level until recently was believed
to provide future opportunities.
In addition to these, any deepening of Russia’s political crisis is likely to have an
impact on energy-export companies, resulting in bad management, less investment, and
smaller supply volumes to economies like Bulgaria.
Future similar effects would depend on the ability of the Bulgarian economy to grow.
However, one of the factors influencing the growth rate, that concerns both portfolio
and strategic investors, lies in the identified liabilities of the Bulgarian economy.
Figures reflecting Bulgaria’s foreign debt payments make up the following table.
Scheduled external debt service by creditors, 1999-2004
(USD, millions)
                                           
12  Tourism losses in 1998 have reached about 10% of registered revenues, solely because of ceased
transfers from Russian banks.
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1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Amortization (total) 651 584 812 566 537 558
IBRD 51 66 70 74 87 95
EBRD/EIB 32 42 47 52 35 33
IMF 137 200 295 157 38 14
G-24 172 115 83 20 0 0
Bilateral 38 58 72 86 101 98
Bonds 32 18 0 0 0 0
Other Commercial 7 7 2 0 0 0
Commercial Bank 0 0 10 20 40 50
London Club 0 0 16 111 190 222
Paris Club 182 178 217 46 46 46
Interest payments
(total)
519 486 523 479 456 443
IBRD 61 62 63 60 58 56
EBRD/EIB 18 21 22 23 24 27
IMF 61 47 33 13 2 2
G-24 26 10 1 0 0 0
Bilateral 18 20 21 22 21 20
Bonds 1 0 0 0 0 0
Other Commercial 0 0 0 0 0 0
Commercial Bank 3 7 14 17 19 19
London Club 277 281 364 342 332 319
Paris Club 54 38 22 3 0 0
Total Debt Service 1170 1170 1335 1045 993 1001
Source: BNB, Merrill Lynch.
The Bulgarian economy would need to produce around US $1,120 of surplus every
year, just in order to meet its foreign debt obligations. This amount is roughly 10% of
the 1996 GDP, when it contracted by almost 11%.
An additional factor to be taken into account is the level of domestic debt services. A
currency board regime presupposes that there is no essential difference between
foreign and domestic debt, except agreed foreign debt payments’ seniority (Brady and
other provisional debt-restructuring deals). However, a problem stems from the BGL
being pegged to the DM: part of the domestic debt is dollar-denominated, amounting
to $950 million; its value appreciates with the depreciation of the DM against the
USD. Thus, 10% annual DM depreciation (as was the case in 1997) would lead to a
ten percent increase of the dollar-denominated debt.
Some grounds for the assessment of prospects for growth is provided by the following
two tables, allowing comparison between Bulgaria and other transition countries that
have a currency board.
Current account balance, 1991-1998 (USD, millions)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998f
Exports 3,737 3,956 3,727 3,935 5,345 4,724 4,914 4,500
 % change 5.9 -0.7 5.6 35.8 -11.6 0.5 -8.4
Import 3,769 4,169 4,612 3,952 5,224 4,580 4,518 4,600
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 % change 10.6 10.6 -14.3 32.2 -12.3 -1.4 1.8




-77 -361 -1098 -45 -25.6 -22.3 445.7 -200
 as % of GDP -11.7 -12.6 -14.7 -2.5 2.6 1.6 4.4 -1.8
Source: BNB, IME.
Current account balances in countries with a currency board regime show dynamics. It
seems that it makes no difference whether it is a country emerging from a central-
planning past or an emerging market in general. In the case of Bulgaria, a factor which
may have an impact on export abilities is the peg to the German mark, if the latter
drastically depreciates against the U.S. dollar. We do not however think such a
development is likely.
In 1998 the real challenge in this respect would rather stem from domestic economic
policy patterns. If the government fails to:
? liberalize trade,
? establish transparent privatization and capital markets rules,
? promote sound and prudently-run financial sectors, or
? forego entry barriers for domestic and foreign entrepreneurs,
then the currency board regime will not be able to perform its preventative functions.
Besides its openness, the Bulgarian economy remained virtually untouched during the
October-November 1997 crisis on the global capital markets, the Asian Crisis and the
Russian financial collapse of the summer of 1998. The explanation is in the
underdeveloped nature of the Bulgarian stock market, and in the unclear supply side
and doubtful demand side of this market.
The supply side is hampered by limited information disclosure on the stocks offered, or
by the low quality of the information. Fixing this problem would require at least six to
eight months of work by the Securities and Stock Exchange Commission and the
Parliament. Also, there are a limited number of resource companies that have already
put shares on the floor (Bulgartabac) or are likely to offer shares on the exchange
(such as, say, BTC). An additional problem is constituted by the fact that potential
sellers would prefer to avoid entry barriers and use the OTC market; this is especially
true for the voucher funds, holding about 13% of the assets. FDIs (Solvay, Union
Miniere etc.) do not seem willing to place equities on the local stock exchange, given
opportunities to raise funds internationally.
The demand side is not developing due to various factors: portfolio investors already
have bitter experience because of lacking protection of minority shareholders; banks
are restricted to acquiring equities in the real sector and debt-equity swaps have been
limited by a number of regulations; and investors’ interest is diminished by the lack of
information and unclear gains prospects.
The Bulgarian economy is likely to remain self-protected from shocks coming from the
volatility of global stock markets, due to its underdevelopment, and the price is likely
to be fewer FDIs and slower growth. The Asia financial crisis has not had a significant
impact on the Bulgarian economy. Its effects would stem from the influence of the
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exchange rate fluctuation on Bulgarian exports. The danger to Bulgaria’s external
balance equilibrium comes from the Russian crisis. The Russian import share is high
(28% for 1997), and the crisis will have an unfavorable impact on the Bulgarian-
Russian foreign trade balance.
On the regional (Balkan) level, this would mean lost economic opportunities. The
latter should be considered on two levels.
The first is a scenario in which emerging economies in the region fail to proceed with
market reforms. This has already happened in Albania, after a relatively good start (see
tables paragraph 1 of the Annex, Bulgaria and Other Transition Economies) in the
early 1990s, but accompanied by under-development of financial services. The
Yugoslav Federation, despite its potential, has relatively low prospects for economic
growth in the coming three to four years.
However, this market would have disadvantages vis-a-vis Bulgaria, namely:
? Bulgaria’s domestic market prices of tradable goods are being adjusted to the
foreign price levels for food and agriculture products. The prices of non-tradable
goods are low, compared to other European countries. The expectations are the
level of the non-tradable prices to equalize by the year 2000;
? lower labor costs;
? probably, the stability backed by 1997-1998 balance of payment financing by IFIs,
while the Yugoslav Federation (not Macedonia) will be lacking such an external
constraint to populist economic policies; and
? last but not least, this petite common Balkan market is vulnerable to civic unrest
and/or disorders.
Bulgaria’s advantages come from its lower starting point and the higher social cost of
transition paid by the Bulgarian public. Although the hardest time has passed, by the
year 2000-2001 Bulgaria will have an idle but well-trained and educated labor force.
By the end of 1998 unemployment is expected to reach 15% due to the liquidation of
loss-making SOEs.
A special case in point is Romania. It had a reform start similar to Bulgaria in 1997,
but it is a market three times bigger (22.2 million), which has attracted more foreign
investment in absolute terms (per capita figures are comparable, see paragraph 1 of the
Annex) and which is passing through a similar political transition as Bulgaria in 1997.
Bulgaria’s advantage is its more united leadership.
However, as is obvious from the section on savings and investment, the Bulgarian
economy still has to identify its competitive advantages, a process which is related to
privatization, restructuring and the implementation of the general liberalization policies
listed above. If the latter could proceed within a one-year term (up to mid or late
1998), privatization and restructuring would bring about results in terms of
identification of competitive advantages by the year 2000, and after. (Meanwhile, the
impact on productivity and employment is likely to be immediate, due to the
underdevelopment of the private sector.)
Efforts should aim at facilitated access to outside markets and of outside capital to
local markets and cross-country cooperation, operation of businesses and specific
industry sub-sectors, and the need to pass through the following stages:
? facilitated trade through lowering tariff and non-tariff barriers;
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? macroeconomic and political stability;
? cross-regional infrastructure projects;
? compatible financial and capital market regulation; and
? joint strategies to strengthen regional competitiveness.
Growth prospects and advantages
The first 1997 stabilization results demonstrated surprisingly fast curbing of inflation, a
speed which is not known from the experiences of other currency board systems in
Central and Eastern Europe. However, on an annual basis inflation is estimated at
536%, with an unclear tendency in the summer months. The effect of DM-depreciation
on Bulgarian production competitiveness was eliminated by increased aggregate costs
in the economy. This should be regarded as an indicator of a need for structural
support for stabilization efforts, probably requiring prompter privatization than that
which was targeted for 1997 and 1998 in the government’s agreement with the IMF
and the World Bank.
Inflation in 1997
January February March April May June
43.8% 243.7% 12.3% -0.7% 5.6% 0.8%
July August September October November December
3.7% 5.5% 3.6% 0.5% 0.5% 1.5%
Source: NSI
Inflation in 1998
January February March April May June
2.0% 1.7% -0.1% 0.1% 0.5% -1.9%
July August September October November December
-1.5% -0.9% 3.0% -0.3% -0.9% -0.7%
Source: NSI
In 1998 there was even deflation for the first eight months of the year. This was due to
the low prices of some commodities in the summer —  mainly food and vegetables. It
could be said that the negative trend in prices was a result of decreased domestic
demand —  something extremely dangerous for a recovering economy. Nevertheless,
inflation for the whole year is not expected to reach 6%.
The economic growth problem appears to be a crucial one in the years after 1998.







  Real GDP
(1997 $)
billion
 Population   GDP per
capita (1997 $)
18
1997 17 134 -6.9 9.8 8 600 000 1 139
1998 17 734
3,5 10,43
8 600 000          1 213
1999 18 354
3,5 10,80
8 587 500          1 257
2000 18 997
3,5 11,17
8 575 000          1 303
2001 19 757
4,0 11,62
8 556 000          1 358
2002 20 547
4,0 12,09
8 537 000          1 416
2003 21 369 4,0
12,57
8 518 000          1 476
2004 22 330
4,5 13,14
8 499 000          1 546
2005 23 335
4,5 13,73
8 480 000          1 619
Assumptions:
1. BGL/USD exchange rate used  - 1700
2. Long-term decrease in population - according to NSI
Our assumption is that the real GDP in BGL will have a growth between 3.5 and 4.5
until 2005. We forecast gradual increase of the growth  starting from 3.5 and gradually
increasing. The government expects real growth of 3,7% for 1999, however our
forecast is more modest. The reasons for that are the slow process of the structural
reform and the severe decline of base metal and chemical prices, which account for
about 40% of the country’s exports. The expectations show that a sustainable growth
will be reached after the year 2004. Real GDP per capita shows a stable trend of
increase because of the GDP growth and the constant population decrease. Given the
above assumptions for the GDP growth significant GDP per capita growth is to be
expected not until 2004-2005.
Factors to Reduce Country Risks in the Short Term
As mentioned earlier, a key factor is the currency board system. Besides this, other
supporting factors are as follows:
1. IFIs have a major role in Bulgarian economic decision making, and in the short run
would restrict populist policies and force the country to speed up reforms;
2. Bulgaria has no choice but to compete with neighboring countries to attract foreign
investment;
3. Bulgaria has no alternative leadership, and the incumbent one is the most market
oriented, enjoying high approval rates; and
4. for the first time in its transition history, Bulgaria has all sections of its government
dominated by a market-oriented political party.
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To these we may add a “bureaucratic factor”: the Bulgarian government may still
attempt to delay privatization and limit the reduction of transaction costs and
enforcement of private property and contracts, but the economy has no room for
maneuvering. The reason: the 1998 rationale of EFF policies still has to be internalized
by the Bulgarian administration and institutions and the public.
